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LIKE SNOW TO THE ESKIMOS AND TRUMP TO THE REPUBLICAN PARTY:
THE ALI’S MANY WORDS FOR, AND SHIFTING PRONOUNCEMENTS ABOUT,
“AFFIRMATIVE CONSENT”
Kevin Cole1
Because we generally see little advantage in distinguishing among
various kinds of snow, we are amused by the idea that the Eskimo languages
have a great number of words for it—even if that idea is false. We can
appreciate however, that “affirmative consent” can take many forms.
Objections to and support for affirmative-consent standards will vary
depending not only on the reader’s perspective but also on how the affirmativeconsent standard is implemented.
The drafters of the American Law Institute’s draft sexual assault
provisions have defined “consent” in a striking number of ways over the past
several months. Commentary accompanying those provisions has also shifted
quickly over this period. The earlier commentary clearly classified the proposal
as an affirmative-consent standard, even though it rejected the requirement
advocated by some that sexual penetration be preceded by verbal permission.
More recent drafts, on the other hand, claim to reject an affirmative-consent
approach in favor of a “contextual-consent” model.
In a previous piece,2 I traced the recent “consent” definitions through
Council Draft No. 33 and argued that the alleged shift from affirmative to
contextual consent changed little of substance and did not respond to the most
serious problems with the earlier drafts, which I had previously discussed at
length.4 This short follow up addresses the changes between Council Draft No.
3 and the newest draft, Preliminary Draft No. 6.5 In some respects, the current
draft reverses course on concessions previously made to critics. In others, the
current draft makes changes that appear to respond to concerns but couple them
with other changes that undermine the reform. And on the central issue of the
mens rea required for conviction, the draft continues an approach that likely
would be implemented so as to impose liability for those guilty of mere tort
negligence in failing to recognize the social harm they were risking—that their

1

© 2016, Kevin Cole. Professor, University of San Diego, School of Law.
Kevin Cole, Backpedalling in Place: The ALI’s Move from “Affirmative” to “Contextual”
Consent (available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2714057).
3 MODEL PENAL CODE: SEXUAL ASSAULT AND RELATED OFFENSES (Council Draft No. 3, Dec. 15,
2015) [hereinafter DEC. DRAFT].
4 Kevin Cole, Better Sex Through Criminal Law: Proxy Crimes, Covert Negligence, and Other
Difficulties of “Affirmative Consent” in the ALI’s Draft Sexual Assault Provisions, ___ SAN
DIEGO L. REV.
___ (forthcoming 2016) (Oct. 2015 draft available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2670419).
5 MODEL PENAL CODE: SEXUAL ASSAULT AND RELATED OFFENSES (Preliminary Draft No. 6, Mar.
2, 20165) [hereinafter CURRENT DRAFT].
2

2

partners were not willing to engage in the sex act in question.6 This was the
most troubling feature of the project’s early affirmative-consent proposals, and
it persists, regardless of the word used to describe it.
I.

MENS REA

The current draft changes the definition of consent but is still most
likely to be interpreted contrary to the Model Penal Code’s usual approach
requiring subjective culpability regarding the social harm at issue—the
partner’s unwillingness. Previously, the draft forbade penetration in the absence
of “positive agreement,” and later “agreement.” Now, the draft forbids
penetration without “behavior, including words, conduct, acts, and omissions,
that communicates willingness to engage in a specific act of sexual
penetration.” Like earlier versions, the current consent definition articulates an
objective conception of consent—consent is not the partner’s mental state, but
rather certain manifestations of the partner’s mental state, the “behavior . . . that
communicates willingness.”
As argued previously,7 these kinds of objective standards are especially
likely to be viewed as questions of law not subject to the mens rea language in
a statute.8 Presumably the jury will determine which historical facts the actor
nonrecklessly believed. Then the jury will determine the normative question of
whether those historical facts suffice to establish “behavior . . . that
communicates willingness.” That normative question is one regarding which
the actor’s mens rea is not clearly required, and it is the kind of question that is
often regarded as a legal question to which mens rea requirements do not apply.
In essence, the actor’s subjective mental state is likely to be relevant regarding
the historical facts regarding consent, but not whether those facts would suffice
to meet the normative standard of consent.9
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The current draft’s many illustrations that require the actor to be at least
reckless regarding consent do not conflict with this reading, since in each one
the mens rea requirement could be applied to the historical component of the
consent requirement rather than to normative component. Indeed, given that the
draft has now specified the mental state its proxy rule seeks to serve
(willingness), the illustrations would most likely speak in terms of willingness
(instead of consent) when they discuss mens rea if they were indeed intended
to signal that the actor must be subjectively culpable about what the partner’s
behavior means. That is certainly how the commentary spoke several drafts ago
when it tried to make that point in defense of its proposal to apply the
affirmative-consent model to all sexual conduct.10 Nothing in the current
illustrations speaks to mens rea in this way. In fact, Illustration 2 in the current
draft speaks in negligence language, though in a somewhat confusing way.11
II.

THE UNDERLYING SOCIAL HARM

The draft’s shift from “positive agreement” and “agreement” to
“behavior communicating willingness” is an advance in that it removes one
element of ambiguity from those earlier formulations—the draft’s view of the
partner’s mental state that describes the social harm sought to be avoided with
the draft’s proxy rules. We now know that the mental state is unwillingness,
rather than unwelcomeness, lack of enthusiasm, and the like.
But we may know less than we think. The Reporters’ Memorandum
proclaimed that Council Draft No. 3 “eliminates language requiring the consent
to be ‘positive,’ ‘freely given,’ and ‘absent until . . . communicated.’”12 But in
the current draft, the “freely given” requirement reappears in slightly different
garb. The draft requires that “All the circumstances must be considered in
determining whether a person has given consent, including any physical or
verbal resistance and any circumstances preventing or constraining
resistance.”13
This open-ended language has the potential to undo any increased
clarity the draft may have promised. That is because a partner’s willingness is
usually influenced by many factors, some of which we will deem to vitiate
consent. For example, one might say that a person is willing to have sex when
threatened with death as an alternative, in that the person prefers sex to death.
Obviously, if the consent standard were our only weapon, we would need to
10
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have a provision indicating that a threat of death vitiates consent. Although
consent is not the draft’s only weapon, the draft already has a provision
specifying certain specific conditions as vitiating consent.14
The open-ended language about circumstances constraining resistance
could be used to add to this list in unpredictable ways. For example, if a partner
agrees to sex because of an actor’s cajolery, is the partner’s continuing
resistance been constrained by that cajolery? To abstract from a recently
publicized case, if a partner agreed to have sex rather than walking across a
cold campus to her own dorm room, knowing that the actor would not let her
stay unless they had sex, is the partner’s continued resistance constrained by
the choice she faced?
If “circumstances . . . constraining resistance” is not given a narrow
interpretation, the apparent gain in clarity achieved by the reformulated consent
standard will quickly take on the same murky quality that the drafters claimed
to reject in Council Draft No. 3.
III.

OBJECTIVE CONSENT STANDARDS AND THE BASELINE
QUESTION

Council Draft No. 3 stated, “Although a subjective definition of
‘consent’ has appeal, only a conduct-based conception of consent is
workable.”15 Apparently, the drafters thereafter became aware that the
Restatement of Torts has for many years defined “consent” in subjective terms,
for the current draft states, “Although a subjective definition of consent has
appeal, only a behavior-based concept is workable in the criminal law.”16
The draft nowhere explains this position. But one obvious difference is
that in the criminal law, the actor needs to be proven guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt. And so one might infer that the reason the drafters believe a subjective
standard would be unworkable in the criminal law is that convictions would be
too hard to obtain under that standard.
The same could be said, of course, about the other crimes covered by
the Model Penal Code, for which the Code typically required subjective
awareness of the risk of social harm, or at least gross negligence regarding that
risk. It is doubtless true that the problems of proving guilt of sexual assault are
typically greater than the problems of proof surrounding many crimes. It is also
true, however, that in sexual assault cases, proving innocence is harder too.
Many jurisdictions do apply objective consent standards in sexual
assault cases. A question remains as to what baseline the ALI should consult in
14
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assessing the draft. Should it look to how the draft fits with the principles of the
Model Penal Code, or instead look to the state of the law across the country?
Some skepticism is justified regarding objective consent standards in the states.
They developed against a backdrop of resistance requirements that largely
eliminated the need to think about fairness to the defendant in the consent
standard. Indeed, many jurisdictions made consent a strict liability element.
More generally, politicians rarely lose votes by being tough on crime. In
California, for example, simple negligence in causing death by automobile is a
crime. That the Model Penal Code’s approach has not gained uniform
acceptance is insufficient reason to abandon it now. Indeed, if anything,
developments since the promulgation of the Model Penal Code suggest that
now more than ever, a model of fair criminal law is a useful counterweight to
the pressures that push legislators toward harsh criminal responses to social
problems.
IV.

REFORM THROUGH FATIGUE

ALI critics of the sexual assault proposal could not be faulted for
feeling as if they are in a game of Whack-a-Mole designed to end in rotatorcuff surgery. High penalties for sex in the absence of affirmative consent were
replaced with misdemeanor penalties, but have now risen to the felony level
again. Early versions of the project included a provision that would criminalize
a wide range of inducements that would vitiate apparent consent, a provision
eliminated only to be replaced with an open-ended requirement that consent be
“freely given,” which has now been replaced with a requirement of attention to
circumstances constraining resistance. Critics concerned that commentary
favorable to defendants did not match the statutory text saw the text amended
to include some of those ideas, only to see that text disappear in the most recent
draft.17 Bold proclamations of a shift from “affirmative” to “contextual”
consent end up, on examination, to have changed very little.18
Public-choice theory teaches that those most interested tend to win in
the legislative process. The ALI is not immune from this dynamic. Specialists
in sexual assault law have greater incentives to see their ideas embraced than
generalists have to oppose them. Eventually, even dedicated and thoughtful
generalists will be tempted to point to the progress they have made in reining
in the specialists and to declare victory. The losers in the process await
identification, through the criminal process.
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